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l::> 



COURT OF INQUIRY 

ON" MAJ.-GENL. HOOKER'S REPORT OF THE NIGHT ENGAGEMENT OF 

WAUPIATCHIE. 



ARGUMENT OF MAJ.-GEN. CARL SCHURZ. 



HcTicered Fehfttary 12th, 1S64. 



In submitting tbe case to this Court of Inquiry, I am obliged to notice 
a circumstance which is of a delicate nature, but about which I shall speak 
with entire frankness. I asked for this investigation, and it was granted. 
The manner in which it was granted deviates in a remarkable degree from 
the recognized usage of military life. I think there never was a military 
court in the Army of the United States, not one member of which held 
an equal rank with the accused ; and I doubt, whether there ever was a 
court of inquiry in this army, all the members of which belonged to the 
command of the accuser. I am far from intending any reflection upon the 
Court, as it is now constituted ; for there is probably no man in the army 
who has less of the pride of rank in him than I ; nor do your official re- 
lations to the accuser in this case, give me any uneasiness as to your im- 
partiality. But I wish to observe, that in accepting the form in which this 
investigation was offered to me, I had to waive a question of propriety. 
In justice to you I waived that question without hesitation ; in justice to 
myself I have to notice it. 

In Maj.-Genl. Hooker's report of the night engagement of Wauhatchie, 
we find the following paragraph : 

" I regret that my duty constrains me to except any portion of my 
" command in ray commendation of their courage and valor. The brigade 
" dispatched to the relief of Geary, by orders delivered in person to its Divi- 
" sion Commander, never reached him until long after the fight had ended. 



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" It is alleged that it lost its way, when it had a terrific infantry fire to 
"guide it all the way ; and also, that it became involved in aswarap, where 
" there was no swamp or other obstacle between it and Geary, which should 
" have delayed it a moment in marching to the relief of its imperiled com- 
" panions," 

By this paragraph I considered myself and my command deeply 
wronged. This censure has gone forth to the world, and I asked for a 
fair investigation of the charge, the result of which shall be as public as the 
charge itself. You are ordered, after having investigated the circumstances 
connected with the case, to give an opinion, as to whether the strictures 
contained in the above paragraph in Genl. Hooker's report, were deserved, 
by the conduct of myself or Col. Ilecker, or any part of my command 
during the engagement of Wauhatchie. These strictures imply, that a 
part of my command, directed to perform a certain task, by orders deliv- 
ered to me in person, rendered itself liable to be solemnly excepted in a 
commendation for courage and valor bestowed on other troops, or, in other 
words, to be stigmatized as lacking courage and valor. To show the in- 
justice of the reflection, I shall recount the occurences of that night strictly 
according to the evidence before you. 

On the evening of the 28th of October, the two Divisions of the 1 1th Corps 
encamped near Brown's Ferry ; the command of Genl. Geary lay at Wau- 
hatchie. The troops had arrived not long before dark. The distance be- 
tween the two encampments was about three (3) miles ; the country which 
separated them partly open, partly covered with woods and thickets, and 
here and there intersected by marshy water-runs. The road from Wau- 
hatchie to Brown's Ferry was muddy, but not impassable ; the ground 
alongside of the road, in places wet and difiicult of passage. The night 
was pleasant — the light of the full moon, from time to time, obscured by 
streaks of clouds. 

After midnight wo were aroused by the sound of musketry heard in 
the direction of Geary's camp. The liveliness of the firing indicated an 
attack. The troops were called under arras. Orders were brought to rae 
by two of Genl. Eooker's Aides, and by Genl. Uooker himself. About 
the nature of these orders the testimony conflicts. Genl. Hooker says, he 
ordered me to double-quick my whole Division to the relief of Geary ; 
Genl. Butterfield says the same, but he heard only the orders Genl. 
Hooker gave two of his Aides to transmit to me, one of whom was charged 
to communicate the same orders to Genl. Hjward. The two Aides re- 
ferred to, Capt. Hall and Lieut. Oliver, testify, that they delivered to me 
orders from Genl. Hooker to throw forward the Brigade nearest at hand. 



Genl. Butterfield is therefore mistaken. One of my Staff Officers, who 
was present, when Genl. Hooker gave me his orders in person, states that 
I was ordered to throw forward my nearest Brigade, Tyndale's, at once, and 
to follow up the movement with the rest of my command. This has the 
weight of the testimony in its favor, and it agrees with my recollections. 
The difference, however, is not very material, as the manner in which I 
executed the order, answered even Genl. Hooker's version of the story. 
The troops were soon in motion, and even Genl. Hooker admits, that the 
turning out of the troops was splendid. As soon as the alarm was given, 
and before the order to march had reached me, I had sent one of my 
Aides to the 2d and 3d Brigades, to bring the columns from the camps 
down towards the road. Then, leaving my Chief of Staff behind for the 
purpose of superintending the movement of the 2d and 3d Brigades, 
which were ordered to follow the 1st, I placed myself at the head of 
Tyndale's column, and directed its march towards the firing. It is proved, 
that the orders I left to ray Chief of Staff to transmit, were correctly given, 
first by Capt. Greenhut, Asst. Adjt.-General of the 3d Brigade, who re- 
ceived them, and then by Lieut. Kluetsch, who heard them communicated 
to the Commander of the 2d Brigade. These orders were not only cor- 
rectly given, but also correctly executed, for it is proved, that the troops 
marched without delay, and in the right direction, following the advance. 

No military man will pretend that these orders were not answering the 
object and fitting the circumstances. The ground over which I had to 
march was not reconnoitered outside of the road. The only indication we 
had of the intentions of the enemy was the firing at "Wauhatchie. If the 
attack on Geary was serious, it was not only possible, but probable, that the 
enemy would occupy some position in the valley in order to protect their 
rear. This would have been correct, and was, therefore, probable. 
Whether we would meet them, where, and in what strength, we had to 
find out; and in order to find it out I placed myself at the head of the 
advance. 

To give, in this state of absolute uncertainty, special instructions to 
brigades marching in the rear, to do this or to do that, would have been 
absurd ; their part in the action depended upon circumstances, and the 
circumstances had first to be ascertained. My orders covered this case com- 
pletely ; according to them my brigades were to be at hand to be used as 
circumstances would demand. And the testimony shows clearly enough 
that they would have been at hand had not other agencies interfered. 

Relying upon their following me, I pushed forward, skirmishers in ad- 
vance. The evidence shows that on the ground as it then was, troops could 
not be moved with more speed. When opposite the hill now known as 



Smith's Hill, the bead of the column received a volley from the left. It 
•was on this occasion that one of my Aides, of whom the testimony speaks, 
was wounded by my side. The head of the column stopped a moment, 
fired a few shots in return, and upon the order to cease firinc^, pushed on again 
towards Wauhatchie. Meanwhile the firing on Smith's Hill became lively ; 
it was evident that our troops were engaged with the enemy on that spot. 
At the same time the firing near Geary's camp died gradually away. 

General lloward, who had been with my command and left it not long 
before we reached the hill, afterwards known as Tyndale's, sent me word 
through Captain Stinson, one of his Aides, that he desired me to move fur- 
ward as rapidly as possible. Soon afterwards the skirmishers became en- 
tangled in a boggy thicket, which was impenetrable for troops. We had 
left iho road at a place a few rods behind where it makes a slight turn, and 
moved forward on a bee line. The skirmishers were recalled, and after a 
stoppage of a few moments, the column regained the road by a movement 
to the left. 

"While this was going on I received notice that my 3d Brigade had 
been halted near Smith's Hill, and was under instructions from General 
Hooker himself, and also that the 2d Brigade had been halted by order of 
General Hooker, and was to go to Chattanooga. 

I received this notice, as the evidence shows, with regard- to the 3d 
Brigade, through Major Howard of the Corps Staff, and wilh regard to the 
2d Brigade through Captain Orlemann, a member of the 2d Brigade staff. 
Until then I had been firmly believing that the 2d and 3d Brigades were 
following me according to orders, and the testimony proves this belief to 
have been very well founded until the brigades arrived near Smith's Hill. 
About the same time I received through Lieut. Oliver, of General Hooker's 
staff, the order to take and occupy the hill now known as Tyndale's with 
one brigade. 

I replied to Lieut. Oliver that I was ordered by General Hooker himself 
to push through to Geary, He observed that General Hooker wanted to 
have the hill occupied with a brigade, and repeated the order. While this 
order struck me as contradictory to orders originally received, it struck me 
also that circumstances might have changed. The firing at Geary's camp, 
as the testimony shows, had died out; for some time the action had been 
far more lively in my rear than in my front. The enemy had, perhaps, 
made a new movement. The order delivered by Lieut. Oliver was, in- 
deed, not in keeping with General Hooker's original order ; but General 
Hooker, as I was informed by two reliable staff officers, had kept back my 
two brigades, and that was likewise against the original understanding, and 
could hardly be without a sufficient cause. The word General Howard had 



J~^ 



sent rae through Captain Stinson could hardly come into consideration. 
General Howard had been with my column and left it not long before ; he 
was probably not informed of what was going on in the rear. But above 
all, the order brought by General Hooker's aide was positive ; General 
Hooker was highest in command on the field ; this was his last order, and, 
according to all military rules, it is the last order that counts. I had no 
choice. 

The testimony given by Lieut. Oliver, when first on the stand, is 
remarkable in one respect. While he expressed himself with an air not 
uncommon among young staff officers about other matters, how he ordered 
this, and ordered that, he seems to leave it somewhat in doubt whether 
the order to take and occupy the hill, was a suggestion of his own or an 
order of Genl. Hooker. If it had been a suggestion of his own, if he 
really had given an order without due authority from his chief, his conduct 
would be open to grave charges ; for that he delivered it as positive order, 
is proved by another witness, who heard him deliver it. But to his justi- 
fication it may be said, that his memory does not appear to be of the most 
faithful as to details. He saw and heard my whole advance brigade halt 
and fire, when the other witnesses heard only a few scattered shots. He 
heard of a line of battle in our front at Tyndale's Hill, a thing which would 
have been so important, that every officer on the ground would have known 
or heard of it ; but none of the other witnesses remember any such thing. 
His conversation with me as he reports it, must be taken with the same 
grain of allowance ; it is only the substance of it which can be accepted as 
reliable. 

But there are three things which leave no doubt as to the genuineness 
of this order, all three of which show that I acted correctly in obeying 
it, and two of which bear out Lieut. Oliver in giving it. The first is, that 
Lieut. Weigel, who heard Lieut. Oliver deliver it, testifies that it was de- 
livered as a direct and positive order ; the second is, that Genl. Hooker, 
in his report, in his letter, and and in his testimony, states, that the order 
was given by him and duly executed by me ; and the third is, that Lieut. 
Oliver reported the fact immediately to Genl. Hooker, and Genl. Hooker 
received the report with silent approbation. Genl. Hooker is very clear 
and positive about this matter, and it is perhaps the only point about which 
his testimony is not in conflict with that of the other witnesses. No doubt 
is admissible. 

Let me continue my account of the occurrences wliich now took place. 
Three regiments were sent up the acclivity and gained the crest with a 
loss of a few killed and wounded. Lieut. Oliver indeed heard but a few 
shots, hardly any. He heard perhaps not as many shots as we had men 



killed and wounded. It is in keeping with his other statements about de- 
tails. But he testifies also, that he left very soon after he had given rae 
the order, and went back to Genl. Uooker to report to him. When he 
left, part of the Brigade was still on the road. If the firing had really 
been as he described it, Generals Hooker and Butterfield, who were behind 
me at a considerable distance, would hardly have noticed it. 

My situation was now as follows: knowing that Lieut. Oliver, Genl. 
Hooker's Aide, had gone back to General Hooker, and having informed him 
of the circumstance, that after the taking of the hill I had no troops to send 
to Geary, as the balance of my command was kept back, I was justified in 
expecting that Lieut. Oliver would give General Hooker 'a true and com- 
plete report of what had happened. For that is one of the duties of a 
Staff officer. If, then, anything was found to be wrong or not in accord- 
ance with General Hooker's views, I had a right to expect that General 
Hooker would correct the mistake by sending me further orders, for Lieut. 
Oliver having just left rae, he knew well where I was. 

Meanwhile, being ordered to occupy the hill, the importance of which 
consisted in its commanding one of the few passes leading through that 
chain of ridges, we proceeded to do it as it ought to be done. When we 
had obtained possession of the crest, the troops were promptly put in 
position. Such parts of the line as were loose and weak, had to be strength- 
ened, connections to be established, a reserve to be placed in a suitable location. 
The wounded were carried to the rear. Patrols were dispatched to explore 
the ground in our front and our flanks, the skirmishers were thrown forward. 
It was reported by an officer, that he had seen something like a column 
passing to our right. Patrols were sent in that direction to ascertain the 
truth of the statement. The completion of such arrangements will, under 
all circumstances, take some time, especially in the night, and on un- 
even and densely wooded ground, where nothing can be discerned with 
certainty, even at a moderate distance. During that time Lieut. Oliver 
might well have reported to General Hooker ; Genl. Hooker might well 
have taken things into consideration, and sent me new orders if anything 
was not in accordance with his views. I received no further orders. The 
firing had meanwhile ceased at all points, except a few straggling shots 
here and there, such as skirmishers will fire at random in or after a night 
engagement, and I was justified in supposing that everything was as desired. 
So I rode back in order to see what had happened there. 

I found General Hooker in the midst of my two Brigades, which had 
been stopped on the way when following me. Our conversation was of a 
singular nature. As the testimony indicates, he showed his dissatisfaction 
with my not pushing through to Geary. I replied that I had received 



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his positive, orders tLrongh one of his own staflf officers, to occupy the 
Lill near the raih-oad gap with one Brigade, and that the only Brigade 
with me thus being disposed of, I had no troops to push through 
to Geary. lie observed, that he himself had given me the order to 
push through to Geary two hours ago and ordered me to do so now. 
I asked whether I might now have the Brigades which had been kept 
back, and upon his reply, that I might take them, I marched off. This is 
the substance of the conversation according to the evidence. One of the 
witnesses, who reports it, gives it also as his impression, that Gen. Hooker, 
from what he said, seemed to disown the order delivered to me by Lieut. 
Oliver. Taking this as absolutely correct, we would be forced (o one of 
two conclusions — either Gen. Hooker had not given the order — but that is 
impossible, as he afterwards so repeatedly and emphatically declared that 
he did give it — or General Hooker had led me into a snare by first giving 
me an order and then disowning it, a supposition as unreasonable as it 
would be unworthy. Lieutenant Oliver, who also listened to the conver- 
sation, gives it as his impression, that General Hooker supposed I had 
another Brigade with me, aside of Tyndale's. According to him, therefore 
General Hooker must have thought, that in some manner some of my 
troops must be possessed of ubiquity. But Lieutenant Oliver well knew 
this supposition to be erroneous. According to his own testimony, I had 
informed him at the foot of the Tyndale Hill, that my other Brigades were 
held back, and that if I occupied the hill with one Brigade, I. could not 
reinforce Geary, as I had nothing in hand to do it with. But he testifies 
also, that when reporting to General Hooker the taking of Tyndale's Hill, 
he said nothing to him of my having only that one Brigade in hand. 
I had been careful to give him all the information that was important. 
There my duty ended and his commenced. That he did not com- 
municate the whole of that information to his chief, is a thing which I 
have not to answer for ; my responsibility does not extend to General 
Hooker's Staff. 

But aside of all this, how it was possible for General Hooker to sup- 
pose, that I had more than one Brigade with me when taking the Tyndale 
Hill, you will find difficult to explain, when you hear and consider what 
meanwhile had happened. Stil), as the question, whether I or somebody 
else bears the responsibility for the staying behind of the balance of ray 
command, seems to be the point upon which this whole matter hinges. 
I shall return to it in order to discuss it more fully, after having sufficiently 
elucidated the rest of my movements. 

The testimony show^s that as soon as I resumed command of my 2d and 
3d Brigades, I marched forward. In passing I had the gap between 



8 

Smith's and Tyndale's Hills hastily reconnoitered and ascertained that it 
was not held by any troops. This is the gap through which the main 
Chattanooga road runs ; the road upon which a part of the enemy's force 
had come into the valley. I ordered Colonel IvrzyzanQwaki_t£> take posi- 
tion in this important thoroughfare with a portion of his Brigade, which 
was decimated by picket and other details, while another portion was 
directed to join Colonel Ilecker in marching to Geary. x\rrived at Tyn- 
dale's Hill, Hecker's Brigade was ordered to halt a little while, for the pur- 
pose of awaiting the reinforcement which arrived promptly. A regiment 
was thrown forward into the gorge through which the railroad runs, and 
as soon as the 141st N. Y., the strongest regiment of the 2d Brigade, had 
closed up on Hecker's column, Hecker was ordered to march forward to 
Geary. He executed the order without delay. The ground between 
Tyndale's Hill and Wauhatchie was mostly covered with thick woods on 
both sides of the road. The colunm marched in a formation which is 
proper in the presence of the enemy, front and flanks well covered with 
skirmishers. It arrived at Geary's position about 5 A. M., and we are 
told that Geary met Hecker at 5.30. The day was just breaking. 

Here I wish to say a word about the estimates of time occurring in the 
testimony. It must have struck you that these estimates as given by the 
witnesses are exceedingly uncertain and contradictory. Hardly anybody 
looked at his watch. An interval between two occurrences, which seemed 
to Gen. Hooker nearly two hours, seemed to Gen. Butterfield about five 
minutes. I abstain ihroughout from referring to (ho testimony of the 
latter, because his recollection has evidently lost the thread of events. An 
interval of time appeared to an individual longer or shorter, as his atten- 
tion was more or less engaged or his mind possessed of greater or less 
anxiety. Thus the duration of the stay of the 2d and 3d Brigades at the 
cross-road is evidently under-estimated by most if not all our witnesses. 
About the time occupied by the movement from the cross-roads to Geary, 
we are fortunate enough to have very precise data. Lieut.-Col. Meysen- 
burg met the column at the marshy run about 250 to 300 yards from the 
crossroads. Ho looked at his watch. It was about 4.30. There the 
troops had to undouble files, which inevitably delays the march of a 
column a little. From that place to Wauhatchie, the distance is not far 
from two miles. Taking into consideration, that a little time may have 
elapsed between Col. Hecker's arrival at Wauhatchie and his meeting with 
Geary, it may be concluded with reasonable certainty, that his whole 
march from the cross-roads to Wauhatchie, a march with skirmishers and 
fl inkers through a wooded country and over muddy roads, occupied, in- 
clusive of all delays, not over 45 minutes, probably less. It is well proved, 



/;7 



9 

that this Brigade never lost its way or became involved in a swamp, and 
nobody alleged so. This I submit, was as quick a night's march as any- 
body could desire ; certainly as quick as anybody could execute. 

That Col. Krzyzanowski reported to Geary much later is very natural. 
I had placed him with a fraction of his Brigade into the gap, while a larger 
portion of his command went to Geary with Col. Hecker. That this 
measure was approved and adopted by my superior commanders, is easily 
shown. Lieut.-Col. Meysenburg, Asst. Adjt.-Gen. 11th Corps, testifies, 
that I was ordered to send reinforcements to Hecker, which I had already 
done, but not to evacuate the gap, even if I could leave only a small force 
in it. I had directed Col. Krzyzanowski to stay there in person, because I 
considered the position important and because it was held by fractions of 
several regiments. Lieut.-Col. Meysenburg testifies further, that Col. 
Krzyzanowski was ordered at 7 A. M., to join Geary with the rest of his 
command. Thus I acted under orders. This accounts sufficiently for the 
time of Col. Krzyzanowski's arrival at Wauhatchie. With the manner in 
which these movements were executed, nobody that I know found fault 
and I would not have dwelled upon these matters at such length, had not 
the prosecution shown some disposition to shift from the censure contained 
iu Gen. Hooker's report, upon a new ground, in order to detect, by minute 
microscopic research, perhaps a little flaw in those of my proceedings 
which had not yet been blamed. 

In General Hooker's report, the brigade dispatched to the relief of 
Geary, is blamed for not having arrived there until long after the fight had 
ended. This cannot apply to the movements just described ; for it is 
proved that when Hecker was ordered forward from the cross-roads, the 
fight at Wauhatchie had long been over. To blame him for not arriving 
there before the fight was over, when it was already over before he started 
would have been an absurdity. 

The occurrence which called forth the censure, must have happened pre 
vious to the last movement. The report itself, together with General 
Hooker's letter and testimony, establishes the point beyond controversy. 
The report says : " Directions were immediately given for one of the brig- 
ades, en route to Geary, Tyndale's, to be detached and assault the enemy 
in the hills on the left, and the other brigade to push on as ordered." A, 
brigade was to push on to Geary, while Tyndale's brigade took possession 
of the hills on the left. Why did it not push on ? He who is clear of the 
responsibility for this failure to push on, ought to be clear of the censure. 
This is the point, and the only point to be decided. I will state the cir- 
cumstances which occasioned this failure, strictly according to the testimony 
of five witnesses, all agreeing on the main points. Look back to the open- 
2 



10 

ing scenes of the action. The orders 1 had given before leaving our en- 
campment at the head of the 1st brigade, -were correctly carried out. The 
brigades maiched forward on the road to Wauhatchie, the 2d following the 
1st, and Col. Ilecker with the 3d following the 2d, but, impatient to get 
on, pressing alongside where the ground would permit. After marching 
nearly three-quarters of a mile, the 2d brigade suddenly stops. Hecker, 
btill more imj^atient, sends one of his aides forward to ascertain the cause 
of the delay. The aide returns with the information, that he had seen one 
of the staff officers of the 2d brigade, who had told him, that the 2d 
brigade had just received orders to halt. Col. Hecker replies : " I have 
received no orders to halt, and I shall march on." So he marches his col- 
umn by the 2d brigade, and continues on the road to Wauhatchie. He 
has hardly advanced beyond the 2d brigade when he meets Major Howard 
of the 11th corps staff, on the road. Major Howard tells him to halt his 
troops at the cross-road, one branch of which leads up to the hill on the 
left, now known as Smith's hill. This is done. Major Howard perceives 
General Hooker near the spot, and referring the Colonel to the General, 
says : " Here is General Hooker himself." General Hooker recognizes the 
Colonel, with whom be evidently is acquainted. In reply to General 
Hooker's questions, the Colonel informs him that the troops halting there 
are the 3d brigade, 3d division, and that he is halting in consequence of an 
order received through Major Howard. The General asks where General 
Schurz is, and Colonel Hecker replies : " In the front ; one of his aides 
was just brought by here wounded." The General inquires about the 
other troops or the other brigade, and Colonel Hecker points out to him 
the 2d brigade of my division, standing immediately on his left, and men- 
tions even [the name of its commander, Col. Krzyzanowski. General 
Hooker then instructs Col. Hecker to form his Brigade in such a manner as 
to be able to face towards the hill or towards the valley, as necessity might 
require. Then saying to Col. Hecker, " You stay here," Gen. Hooker 
rides over to the 2d brigade, immediately in front of which he remained 
a considerable time. According to Gen. Hooker's direction, Hecker stays. 
For this we have the testimony of Maj. Howard, Capt. Greenhut, Asst. 
Adjt. General of the 3d brigade, Lieut. Miller and Lieut. Kramer, aides of 
Col. Hecker, and Col. Hecker himself. This conversation being an im- 
portant matter, the testimony must be examined with greater care. Maj. 
Howard, when as a witness before you, must have made upon you the 
impression of a man who is careful and conscientious in his statements. 
He produces as facts only what he knows with absolute certainty ; most of 
his recollections of what happened during a night of battle three months 
ago, he gives as impressions more or less distinct and reliable. The testi- 



^/ 



11 



mony of a witness so conscientious, can be taken at a valuation rather 
above than below that which he himself puts upon it. He states that he 
found Col. Hecker marching, and admits it as not only possible but prob- 
able that he told Col. Hecker to stop at the cross-roads. He tells us, that, 
before he did so, he had been with Gen. Hooker and staff, informing them 
of Col. Hecker's arrival, and that he heard Gen. Hooker or Gen. Butter- 
field say that the troops might be halted at the cross-roads. He further 
gives it as his impression, that he heard Gen. Hooker or Gen. Butterfield 
instruct Col. Hecker to form his brigade so as to be able to make front to- 
wards the valley as well as towards the hills. The corroborative testimony 
of three other witnesses, Col. Hecker, Capt. Greenhut and Lieut. Kramer, 
establishes this point as absolute certainty. 

The testimony of Col. Hecker himself is so clear, distinct and positive, 
that nobody, who knows the man, will breathe a doubt against it. That 
of Capt. Greenhut and Lieut. Kramer, concurs with it in almost every par- 
ticular. All these testify that Col. Hecker was halted by Maj. Howard, 
and that Gen. Hooker was informed by the Colonel of the presence of ray 
2d brigade ; all three testify to the instructions given by the General to 
Col. Hecker, and all three testify to the words pronounced by Gen. Hooker 
when he rode away : " You stay here." This would seem sufficient to ac- 
count for the 3d brigade. Col. Hecker's case is as clear as sunlight. He 
acted under my orders when he marched towards Wauhatchie ; he acted 
under Gen. Hooker's orders when he stayed at the cross-roads. 

As to the 2d brigade, it is to be regretted that its commander, as well 
as its staff officers without exception, are absent with the furloughed veteran 
regiments. I am therefore unable to produce them personally as witnesses. 
But if circumstantial evidence can prove anything, it proves in this case, 
that an agency similar to that which stopped the 3d brigade on its march 
towards Wauhatchie, stopped the 2d also. 

Recall to your minds the following facts established by the testimony 
before you. The 2d and 3d Brigades are pressing forward on their march 
towards Wauhatchie ; the 2d Brigade suddenly stops, and upon inquiry 
Captain Greenhut is informed by a member of the 2d Brigade staff that 
the 2d Brigade has received orders to halt there. The 3d Brigade still 
presses forward, but has hardly passed by the 2d when it is halted also. 
It forms in line of battle fronting towards the hills, and General Hooker 
instructs its commander to form his .troops in such a manner as to be 
able to change front towards the valley. The 2d Brigade is pointed out 
to General Hooker; he rides towards it and halts there, and immediately 
afterwards it is noticed that the 2d Brigade is formed front towards the 
valley. General Hooker remains in front of the 2d Brigade a considerable 



12 

time ; that brigade is, of all troops, nearest to bim. Orders are carried to 
tbat brigade by one of General Hooker's aides, and when it is found out 
that the orders sending the 2d Brigade to Chattanooga arose from a mis- 
take, the brigade is directed to resume its old position. While this is 
going on I am near Tyndale's Hill. Notice is brought to me through a 
staff officer of the lltli Corps that the 3d Brigade is stopped near Smith's 
Hill, and under instructions from General Hooker. Almost at the same 
time notice is brought to me by a staff officer of the 2d Brigade that the 
2d Brigade is stopped near Smith's Hill, and under orders to go to Chat- 
tanooga. Can these circumstances be accidental ? They speak for them- 
selves. 

Nor is this at all strange. Consider the circumstances under which these 
things happened, and you will find an easy explanation. At first there was 
no firing except in the direction of Wauhatchie. The attention of every- 
body was fixed upon that point. My troops are hurried forward to the 
assistance of Gear3\ Suddenl}^, while my column is marching along, a 
volley is thrown upon it from the hills on the left. All at once it is dis- 
covered that this range of hills is occupied by the enemy. This changes 
the whole aspect of affairs. It is not foreseen in the original programme. 
The eflect of this discovery cannot but be startling. General Hooker himself 
says in his testimony : " When the first fire was given from the hills on the 
left, it suggested itself to me that the enemy was trying to get between me 
and Brown's Ferry ;" and Captain Greenhut testifies, it is his impression to 
have heard General Hooker say that he expected the enemy to break 
through between the hills. That would have completely altered the 
character of the action. The principal and most important fight would 
have been, not at Wauhatchie, but between the Chattanooga road and 
Brown's Ferry ; for it was our main object to hold the road between Kel- 
ly's Ferry and Brown's Ferry open. Now imagine General Hooker and 
staff on the very scene of action with such apprehensions suddenly spring- 
ing up in their minds. Is is not possible, nay, even probable, that at such 
a moment General Hooker, thinking of the new danger and considering 
how lo avert it, should have dropped the words : These trooj^s must be 
stopped here, or something to that effect ? Is it not equally probable that 
some zealous staff officers should have taken such words for an order and 
hurried off to put the supposed order in execution ? Look at Major How- 
ard's case; it is exactly in this way that he came to stop Hecker, and Gen- 
eral Hooker confirmed his action by subsequent instructions of his own. It 
is not only probable, but almost certain, at least it is my firm belief, that 
the 2d Brigade which preceded ITecker's was stopped in a similar manner. 
General Hooker's own instructions to Colonel Hecker to be prepared for a 



^ 



^ 7- 



13 



change of front, can be explained upon no other theory but that he was 
expecting an attack. And the staff ofiBcers no doubt acted upon the in- 
spirations of their chief. All this was perfectly natural. There is nothing 
surprising in it. 

But it was not natural that General Hooker should have expected the 
same troops which were held at the cross-roads under his instructions, and 
with his knowledge, at the same time to march to the relief of Geary. 
And it is most unnatural that he should, in his report, charge a lack of 
courage and valor upon commanders and troops because they stood still 
where he, with his own instructions, and under his own eyes, had held 
them. 

It is true, General Hooker's own testimony, although by some unguarded 
admissions supporting the theory upon which I explain these occurrences, 
l>artly ignores, partly contradicts some of the facts upon which this reason- 
ing is founded. I would not subject his depositions on oath to a scrutiny 
were it not a duty I owe to myself and I owe to my commands. That 
duty I perform with regret and reluctance; for when I look upon General 
Hooker's sworn testimony, as it stands there, unsupported by any other 
evidence, in conflict with the testimony of almost every other witness, his 
own Aides included, in conflict even with itself, it is to me a subject of pain- 
ful contemplation. 

As he informs us. Colonel Hecker told him that he was in his position by 
order of General Howard. Colonel Heclier asseverates that he said Major 
Howard, but General Hooker may have misunderstood him. This misun- 
derstanding, however, is of very httle moment. General Hooker goes on 
to tell us that he may have said to Colonel Hecker to wait there for further 
orders from General Howard. General Hooker tells us also, that he had 
advised General Howard of the orders given to me, to double quick my 
division to the relief of Geary. And then he supposed that General How- 
ard, after having been advised of that order, had stopped the troops on their 
way. Indeed ! Does General Hooker not know that General Howard was 
my immediate commander, and that his orders were superior to mine ? If 
General Hooker really was under the impression that General Howard had 
stopped the troops which, by my orders, were marching towards Geary, and 
that these troops, after having been so stopped by General Howard, were 
loft waiting for General Howard's further orders, and waiting in vain, if 
that was really General Hooker's impression, how in the name of common 
sense then could he blame me or my troops for a delay which, in his opin- 
ion, was owing to the orders, or to a neglect of General Howard, my com- 
mander? Either General Hooker did not believe that General Howard 
had ordered these troops to stop, or by blaming me and my command, he 



14 

committed the.'most unaccountable injustice — an injustice for which even the 
cheap pretence of a misapprehension cannot serve as an excuse. 

No, this will not answer. It is well enough established, that Genl. 
Howard gave no orders to halt. He had, indeed, a far different idea of a 
double-quick movement. Instead of halting troops on the way, troops 
whose commanders were impatient to get on, he was with me and Genl. 
Tyndale at the head of the column in march, making every exertion to 
accelerate its progress. It is also well enough established by the instruc- 
tions given to Ilecker, that Genl. Hooker thought very little of Howard or 
of Geary at that time. Such instructions are given only in expectation of 
an attack ; they mean preparation for defense on the spot, and not pre- 
paration for a double-quick movement. In this attitude the Brigades re- 
mained there a considerable time in Genl. Hooker's immediate vicinity, 
under his very eyes, within the reach of his voice, and he did not stir 
them. If he was under the impression, that the troops Avere waiting for 
orders to march forward, why did he not give the orders ? If, in his 
opinion, there was a mistake, why did he not correct the mistake ? Is it 
not one of the principal privileges and duties of a Commander to correct 
mistakes of his subordinates ? But, then Genl. Hooker indulges in state- 
ments still more serious and still more untenable. 

He declares in his testimony, and declares with emphasis, that he gave 
no order at all to Brigades. It is sworn to before four witnesses, by Col- 
onel Hecker, Maj. Howard, Capt. Greenhut, and Lieut. Kramer, that he 
gave the Commander of my 3d Brigade, not only orders, but the very ex- 
plicit instructions above mentioned. With due respect to Genl. Hooker— 
the concurring testimony of these four witnesses admits of no (loubt. 

Again, Genl. Hooker declares, that he knew nothing of presence the of 
ray 2d Brigade on that part of the field. Is it possible ? Three witnesses, 
Col. Hecker, Capt. Greenhut, and Lieut. Kramer, testify, that he was not 
only informed of its presence, but that Col. Hecker in his own emphatic 
and demonstrative manner, which admits of no mistake, pointed it out to 
him as standing immediately on their left ; even the name of its Com- 
mander, Col. Krzyzanowski was pronounced, and that is a name which 
cannot well be mistaken for any other. It is further proved, that Genl. 
Hooker, as soon as the conversation was concluded, rode over to the 2d 
Brigade and remained there. One of Genl. Hooker's own Aides testifies, 
that he carried orders to that Brigade ; that the Brigade was, of all troops, 
nearest to the place where Genl. Hooker stood, and that he presumes Genl. 
Hooker must have been aware of its being there, as it was so near him. 
Lastly, Lieut. Weigel states, that when after the taking of Tyndale's Hill 
he, with me, met Genl Hooker, the commander of the 2d Brigade, Col- 



(^.6 



15 



onel Krzyzanowski, was in Genl. Hooker's immediate presence. And 
Genl. Hooker was ignorant of all this ? 

Lastly, Genl. Hooker declares, that, had he known anything of the 
presence of my 2d Brigade on that part of the field, or had he known, 
that I was forward with only one Brigade, he would have ordered Colonel 
Hecker instantly to march to Wauhatchie. This indeed he might have been 
expected to do, if he really wanted one of my Brigades to occupy the Tyn- 
dale Hill, and another to push through to Geary. Now, mark what he 
did do. It is proved by three witnesses, that immediately after the 2d 
Brigade had been bodily pointed out to him, he gave Col. Hecker instruc- 
tions how to form, and then left him with the words, " You stay here !" 

But to cap the climax, he says himself, he was not positive whether he 
knew that I had more than two brigades in all. He thinks he must have 
known it, or ought to have known it, as he had marched with us from 
Bridgeport to Lookout Valley, but he was not positive. Every candid 
mind will conclude from his report, thut he did not know it, for he speaks 
only of Tyndale's and " the other Brigade." And then, not being positive, 
whether I had more than two Brigades in all, he tells us that he kept one 
of my Brigades back, thinking that two of ray Brigades were in advance. 
Here my willingness to furnish an explanation is at a loss. There is no 
theory upon which I can reconcile his acts with his declarations. 

This testimony, in its relation to the facts as proved by all the other wit- 
nesses, is to me a puzzle. It is almost impossible to suppose that General 
Hooker did not know the Brigades to be there ; for, if he had eyes to see, 
ears to hear, and a mind to understand, he must have been aware of their 
presence. But it is almost equally impossible to suppose that he did know 
them to be there, for, how strange is it, how can it be explained, that he 
did not send them forward, if he wanted to have Tyndale's Hill occupied, 
and Geary reinforced at the same time — and, above all, how can his report 
be accounted for ? I am irresistibly driven to the conclusion that, either 
Gen. Hooker did not clearly fix his mind upon what he saw, heard, said, 
and did, during the night of the engagement, or that he did not clearly fix 
his mind upon what he remembered and wrote at the time of composing 
his report. 

Now let me sum up the facts, as they are established by the evidence. 

It is proved, that, immediately upon receipt of orders, I hurried forward 
at the head of my 1st Brigade, after having directed my 2d and 3d Bri- 
gades to follow. 

It is proved that my orders to the 2d and 3d Brigades were correctly 
delivered, and correctly executed. They did follow me. 

It is proved that, upon the arrival of the head of my column opposite 



16 

Tyndale's Hill, I received oflicial notice of the detention of my 2d and 
3d Brigades, by orders and instructions coming from Gen. Hooker. 

It is proved that these notices were brought by staff officers, whose busi- 
ness it is to carry such information, and that, therefore, I was justified in 
considering it as reliable, which, as the evidence shows, it was. 

It is proved that, at the same time, I received, through one of Gen. 
Hooker's Aides, an order to take and occupy the hill, now known as Tyn- 
dale's, with one Brigade. 

It is proved by the Aide who brought the order, that I duly informed 
him of my having but one Brigade on hand, and of the impossibility of 
reinforcing Geary, if that one Brigade was employed in occupying the hill 

It is proved that the order was repeated, and that it was a positive and 
direct order. That it was Gen. Hooker's order, is proved by Gen. Hooker 
himself in his report, in his letter, and in his testimony. It is proved by 
Gen. Hooker, also, that I did right in executing it; in his own words, the 
order was " duly executed." 

It is proved that all these movements were executed with all jwssible 
speed, and that the troops could not have moved quicker on the ground as 
as it then was. 

So much for the first act of the drama. Now for the second. 

Gen. Hooker swears to his report. While Tyndale's Brigade was di- 
rected to take the hill on the left, " the other Brigade was to push on as 
ordered." This Brigade is censured for not having arrived at Geary's until 
long after the fight had ended, while, as the report says, it had boen dis- 
patched to the relief of Geary by orders delivered in person to its Division 
Commander. Here is the censure, and here is the question to be decided. 
Why did not the other Brigade push on, and why did it arrive long after 
the fight had ended ? 

It is proved that my 2d and 3d Brigades followed the first, in the direc- 
tion of Wauhatchie, according to my orders. 

It is proved that, after having marched a certain distance, the 2d 
Brigade was suddenly stopped on the road, and that the 3d marched by 
the 2d, in the direction of Wauhatchie, according to my orders. 

It is proved that immediately afterwards, the 3d Brigade was halted 
also, and received special instructions from General Hooker himself. 

It is proved that Genl. Hooker's attention was directed to the 2d 
Brigade, that it was pointed out to him, and that he remained with it a 
considerable time. 



/. . z^ 



17 

It is proved that both brigades remained under General Hooker's eyes 
and under his immediate control. 

It is proved that I was officially notified of this by staff officers. 

It is proved that General Hooker, while with my Brigades did not 
order them to Geary. 

It is proved that when I came back from Tyndale's Hill, the Com- 
mander of my 2d Brigade was in General Hooker's immediate presence. 

It is proved that as soon as the control of my two Brigades was restored 
to me, Geary was reinforced with all possible speed. 

It is proved that when my jint Brigade arrived at Tyndale's Hill, the 
firing at Wauhatchie had already ceased, so that it would have been im- 
possible even for that column, in spite of all double-quick movements, to 
arrive there before the end of the fight. 

It is proved, that when Col. Hecker was ordered forward from the 
cross-roads, the fight at Wauhatchie bad long been over. It would have 
been absurd therefore to expect him to arrive there before it was over. 

And now I ask you, with all candor, what is there in all this, that I am, 
or that my troops are to blame for ? Where is the non-compliance with 
orders, and where is the lack of courage and valor ? 

No doubt mistakes were committed. But the question is, whether they 
were my mistakes. It may have been a mistake to take the Tyndale Hill. 
But if so, it was Genl. Hooker's mistake, for he acknowledges to have 
given the order. It may have been a mistake that Genl. Hooker was not 
immediately advised of the impossibility to reinforce Geary, while this order 
was executed. But most certainly it was not my mistake ; for I informed 
Genl. Hooker's Aide explicitly of all the circumstances which produced that 
impossibility. What more had I to do ? If that Aide when he reported 
the facts to Genl. Hooker, did not report the facts fully, as his duty re- 
quired, am I responsible for Genl. Hooker's Aides ? It may have been a 
mistake, that the troops were stopped at the cross-roads. But it was 
not my mistake ; for nobody, I suppose, thinks that I ordered them to 
stop. The case of the 3d Brigade is clearly established ; and as for the 
2d, how was it possible, if such an order had come from me, that one of the 
brigade staff officers should report to me its detention by orders coming 
from General Hooker ? 

If the stopping of the troops was a mere mistake, it is to be regretted, 
that it was not at once rectified. But that mistake happened under Genl. 
Hooker's very eyes ; he, by giving instructions, participated in it, and of all 
men in the world he was the man to remedy it. I did all I could to direct 
his attention to it by giving his Aide all the information that was necessary. 
I will stretch self-criticism to the utmost limit, and say, that I might have 
3 



18 

gone back when I heard that my troops were stopped at the cross-roads. 
But being informed by respectable staff officers, that the two brigades were* 
under Genl. Hooker's immediate control, had I not to suppose that Genl. 
Hooker knew what he was doing, and what he w^anted them for? Besides, 
I had communicated to Genl. Hooker's Aide all that was important. That 
Aide went back to report to his Chief. If anything was wrong, Genl. 
Hooker, by his Aide, knew where I was, and could advise me. Eeceiving 
no further orders, I was justified in believing that all was right. So I re 
mained where I considered my presence most desirable. That Genl. 
Hooker meanwhile held my two brigades where he did not want them, is 
that my mistake ? 

Whatever way you may turn and twist the occurrences of that night, 
you will always arrive at the conclusion, that the mistakes committed 
were not my mistakes, and that of all persons that might be blamed, my 
troops and their commander were the very last. 

I think I could make even Gen. Hooker feel the -injustice of the cen- 
sure contained in his report. "What would we have thought, if, at the 
time of the battle of Chancellorsville, his Corps Commanders had received 
from Washington direct orders to remain in their position near United 
States Ford, and if then in Genl. Halleck's report the following paragraph 
occurred : " I regret that my duty constrains me to withhold the usual 
commendation of courage and valor from the Commander of the Army of 
the Potomac, who, when he heard that Genl. Sedgwick was engaged with 
the enemy near Fredericksburgh, remained with the whole Army quiet 
and inactive in his entrenchments at Chancellorville, deaf to the stirring 
appeals of the terrific artillery and infantry fire in the distance, which made 
known to him the desperate situation of his imperiled companions ?" Or 
another case in point : How would Genl. Hooker feel, if on the evening 
of our arrival in Lookout Valley, the Commander of the 11th Corps had 
received from Genl. Thomas the direct order to camp his whole force near 
Brown's Ferry, and if then in Genl. Thomas' oflScial report the following 
passage had occurred : " I regret that my duty constrains me to except in my 
general commendation of good judgment the Major-General commanding 
the 1 lih and 12th Corps, who, after having marched his troops into Lookout 
Valley, so fivr forgot all the rules of ordinary foresight and caution, as to 
leave a weak detachment isolated at Wauhatchie, without even occupying 
with sufficient forces the gaps, and fofds, and bridges, through and over 
which the enemy could penetrate into the Valley, place himself between 
the said camps, and overwhelm the isolated detachment with superior 
numbers." How would Genl. Hooker relish that ? But if under such 



/^S' 



19 



circumstances such a censure would not be considered just, what must be 
your opinion of the censure in Genl. Hooker's report ? 

Although the parallels are striking, I will confess that the circumstances 
described are only made up for the sake of argument, in so far as I do not 
know that Genl. Halleck in the first, or Genl. Thomas in the second case, 
gave any direct orders to Corps Commanders. 

Before closing I deem it my duty to call your attention to one feature of 
this business, which has an important bearing, not only upon my interests, 
but upon yours and upon those of every subordinate commander in the 
Army. We are bound by the iron chains of military discipline. The 
superior has it in his power to do all manner of things which may work 
serious injury to the honor and reputation of the subordinate, and which 
the latter is but seldom at liberty to disprove, and almost never able to re- 
sent. The greater in this respect the power of the superior, the more is 
he in lionor and conscience bound to use his power with the utmost care 
and discrimination ;. for the honor and reputation of every subordinate 
officer is a sacred trust in the hands of the superior commander. 

The most formidable weapon in the hands of the latter is his official re- 
port of campaigns and actions. It is universally received as documentary 
history, as the purest fountain, from which the future historian can take 
his moat reliable information. Praise and censure conveyed in such a re- 
port are generally looked upon as based u]pon irrefutable evidence, and they 
ought to be. Every conscientious commander will therefore consider it a 
sacred duty before making an official statement affecting the honor and 
reputation of a subordinate, to scrutinize with scrupulous care the least in* 
cident connected with the case, and when at last, after weighing every 
circumstance, he has arrived at the conclusion that his duty commands 
him to pronounce a censure, he will weigh every word he says, so as to be 
perfectly sure that he does not say a word too much. For it must be 
considered, that public opinion is generally swayed by first impressions, 
and an injury once done can but rarely be repaired by a subsequent mod- 
ification of language. 

And now I invite you to apply this criterion, which certainly is a just 
one, to the report of Gen. Hooker. That this report is severe in its reflec- 
tions on a body of troops, nobody will deny. By solemnly excepting them 
in a general commendation of courage and valor, it stigmatizes them as 
destitute of the first qualities which the soldier is proud of. That the re- 
port is a just one, who will, after this investigation, assert 1 

I am far from saying that Gen. Hooker knowingly and wilfully reported 
what was false ; his position ought to exempt him from the suspicion of 
such an act. I have not entertained that suspicion for a moment. But what 



20 

excuse is there for bis error ? There are two things which every conscien- 
tious man will be careful to guard against ; the first is, saying anything to 
the prejudice of another, which he knows to be false ; and the other is, 
saying anything to the prejudice of another, which he does not positively 
know to be true. 

And did Gen. Hooker positively know bis report to be true and 
just ? He could not know to be just what is proved to be unjust ? 
But would it have been impossible to ascertain the truth ? I lived within 
five minutes' walk of his head-quarters. My Brigade Commanders were 
all within call. I saw him almost every day, and a single question would 
have elicited a satisfactory explanation. The question was not asked. Five 
minutes' conversation with his own Aides, Capt. Hill and Lieut. Oliver, 
would have removed the error. Was the error so dear to him, that he 
shielded it with silence against the truth ? But to me it is a mystery how 
that error could stand against the force of his own recollections. Were 
they, too, shut out, when that paragraph was penned ? They would, in- 
deed, have ill comported with the sensational dash with which the diction 
of the censure is flavored. 

You will admit that this is not the way in which troops should be de- 
clared destitute of courage and valor — troops belonging to a Division 
which on three battle-fields lost far more killed and wounded than it 
counted men, when I was put in command, and than itcouuts men to-day ; 
and that this is not the way to treat an officer, not one of whose subordi- 
nates will say that, when he was in a place of danger, his General was not 
with him. This is a levity which would not be admissible in the ordinary 
walks of life — much less in the military world, where every question of 
honor is weighed with scrupulous nicety. 

When looking at this most strange transaction, every impartial observer 
will ask himself, " What can have been the motive of this ?" If the battle 
had been lost, we might have found the motive in the desire of the Com- 
mander to throw the responsibility upon some subordinate whom he might 
select as the unfortunate victim of his embarrassments. This indeed would 
not be noble, nor even excusable, yet we can find the springs of such acts 
among the ordinary weaknesses of human nature. But we were victorious ; 
the results of the action were uncommonly gratifying. And that Gen. 
Hooker should then sit down, and coolly endeavor to consign a fellow- 
soldier, and part of his command, to shame, and afFectingly ornament the 
scene with the fanciful pyrotechnics of a terrific infantry fire flaming 
around imperiled companions — for that I seek the motive in vain. Every 
candid mind will admit that such an act, on such an occasion, can have 
been called forth by one of two things only — either the grossest misconduct 



^c 



21 



on the part of the subordinate, or a morbid desire to blame on the part of 
the Commander. Public and official censures under such circumstances 
are so unusual, that, either, the provocation must be enormous, or the ill 
will uncontrollable. 

It may be asked why the censure in the report is so ambiguous as to 
admit of an application to some Brigade of mine, as well as to myself. In 
my public life I have learned to understand the language of those who 
want to hurt. It is never more insidious than when it merely suggests 
and insinuates. By saying little that is positive, and expressing that little 
obscurely, it opens a wide field for a malevolent imagination. Just 
enough is said in that report to give a hold to backbiting malignity, which 
now may point to an official document as proof, and suggestively add : no 
more was said, in order not to ruin him. I appreciate this tenderness, as 
well as I highly appreciate the elaborate flourish of language, in which the 
greatness of the danger is so artistically, so touchingly, and yet so gratui- 
tously, contrasted with the tardiness of the relief which was caused by su- 
perior orders, and the flirasiness of an excuse which nobody ever thought 
of offering. 

Here I will stop. I feel that I owe you an apology for the length 
and sweep of my remarks. When I entered the Army, I left a position 
of ease and splendor. I might have led a life full of honor and enjoyment 
in other spheres of activity, but after having co-operated in the development 
of the ideas governing this country, I desired to share all its fortunes to 
the last. I entered upon this career with a heart full of enthusiasm and 
readiness for self-sacrifice. I have been quietly endeavoring to do my 
duty, with zeal, but without ostentation. For all this I claim no higher 
consideration than any other man in the Army may claim ; but I do not 
see why I should be satisfied with less. Knowing what material glory so 
frequently is made of, I do not crave for glory, but for justice. Every- 
body that knows me will tell you, that here, as elsewhere, I have been, and 
am the most forbearing and inoffensive of men. And even in this case I 
would have abstained from all sharpness of criticism, had I not, by a series 
of occurrences been tortured into the conviction, that at last I owed it to 
myself and to my troops to array on one occasion the whole truth in its 
nakedness against official and private obloquy. Since the battle of Chan- 
celorsville,-— the first time I had the honor to participate in an engagement 
under General Hooker's command, — since that time, when through 
newspaper articles, dated at the Headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, 
I was covered with the most outrageous slanders, which, although easily 
disproved, were as easily repeated ; since that time until the present day 
I have had to suffer so much from the busy tongue of open and secret 



22 



malignity, that even my well-tried patience was rather too severely tested. 
Under the pressure of military discipline I held out quietly, and in passive 
silence. At last an ofiBcial statement appears, intended to throw disgrace 
upon me and part of my command. Upon this official statement at last 
I can put my finger, and you will not blame me, if I put my finger upon it 
with firmness and energy. But you will bear me witness, that in discussing 
the i;\cts in the case I have said nothing, absolutely nothing, that is not 
clearly substantiated by the evidence before you. If my language was 
severe, you must not forget that the truth is severer still. 

I said that the honor and reputation of a subordinate ought to be held 
as a sacred trust in the hands of his commander. When this trust is 
violated, good fortune gives us at least sometimes an opportunity to right 
ourselves before impartial men. For this opportunity furnished me by 
the Commander of the Army, I am most profoundly thankful ; for if, indeed, 
a General could be found, who, upon a knowledge of facts so lamentably 
imperfect, upon impressions so vague and unaccountable, could launch in to 
the world so odious and wanton an accusation, I doubt whether a Court 
of Inquiry can be found to sanction it. 



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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



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